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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on regional integration agreements (RIAs) is vast.1  It deals
mostly with static effects, and concludes that these effects are ambiguous in
general. This has led a large number of economists to be skeptical about the
benefits of RIAs, particularly for South-South ones. Bhagwati and Panagariya
(1996), World Bank (2000) and Schiff and Winters (2003) show that, under
homogeneous goods, a South-South RIA is likely to lower bloc welfare. The latter
two studies also show that the less developed member country is likely to lose
relative to the more developed one.
In the case of North-South RIAs, the Southern member is likely to lose in
the case of homogeneous goods because it typically has higher trade barriers
than the Northern member, so that it provides larger transfers to the North than it
obtains through its improved access to it.2  For instance, Panagariya (1999) finds
that NAFTA resulted in a static loss for Mexico in 1996 of US$ 3.26 billion, or 0.98%
of GDP.
CGE models using the Armington assumption of products differentiated
by country of origin typically generate gains for Mexico from NAFTA. These
gains are small under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect
competition (Bachrach and Mizrahi, 1992) and are larger under increasing returns
to scale and imperfect competition (e.g., Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 1991; Roland-
Holst et al., 1992; Sobarzo, 1992). Brown et al. (1991) obtain a gain of US$ 1.98
billion, or 0.63% of GDP, due to the removal of tariffs and NTBs under NAFTA.
There has been little analysis of the dynamic effects of RIAs and none of
NAFTA. Some studies have used CGE models to examine the potential impact of
NAFTA on industry location and productivity (Hunter et al., 1992; Krugman and
Hanson, 1993). Hunter et al. conclude that NAFTA would result in relocation of
production of the auto industry to Mexico, with fewer but larger firms in Mexico
producing more output with a lower price-cost margin.
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1 A recent overview of that literature is  World Bank (2000) and Schiff and Winters
(2003).
2 A sufficient (though not necessary) condition for this result is an internal solution
where the Southern member continues to import from excluded countries after formation
of the RIA.
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So far, there has been no empirical analysis of the dynamic effects of RIAs
based on their impact on technology diffusion. This paper is a first attempt in this
direction. It examines the impact of NAFTA on TFP in Mexico through its impact
on trade-related technology diffusion from OECD countries. The paper is part of a
World Bank Project on Trade and Technology Diffusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief analytical
framework. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation. Section 4 presents
the empirical results, Section 5 simulates the impact of NAFTA and Section 6
concludes.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical basis for the approach used here is endogenous growth
theory (Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 1988). Grossman and Helpman (1991) extend the
analysis to an open economy setting. The basic idea is that goods embody
technological know-how and therefore countries can acquire foreign knowledge
through imports. Coe and Helpman (1995) provide an empirical implementation of
the open economy endogenous growth model. They construct an index of the
foreign R&D to which a country has access as the trade-weighted sum of that
country’s trading partners’ stocks of R&D. They find for a sample of developed
countries that both domestic and foreign R&D have a significant impact on TFP,
and that TFP  increases with the general degree of openness of the economy and
with openness towards the larger R&D producing countries.3
The same issue was examined by Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) for
developing countries. They find that developing countries benefit more from foreign
R&D spillovers, the more open they are and the more skilled is their labor force.
This paper builds on Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga (2002). That paper expanded on
Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997) by examining these issues at the
industry level in developing countries.4  The idea is that importing countries learn
from the knowledge embedded in the inputs that they import, as is shown in
Section 3 below.
3. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Coe and Helpman (1995) estimate the following equation:




ct d ct ct > b b e + b + b + a =
3 Keller (1998) argues that Coe and Helpman’s finding on trade as a channel for R&D
spillovers is not entirely conclusive. Lumenga-Neso et al. (2001) show that Coe and
Helpman’s results do seem to hold once “indirect” trade-related R&D spillovers are
taken into account.
4 Keller (2002a) did examine trade-related R&D spillovers at the industry level for the
G-7 countries and Sweden.
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where  d
ct RD ( f
ct RD ) is the domestic (foreign) R&D stock, e  is an error term, and c
(t) denotes country (year). Due to lack of data for Mexico (and for developing
countries in general)– and as in Coe et al. (1997) and Schiff et al. (2002) –the
estimation in this paper does not include domestic R&D. This is unlikely to be a
problem because most of the world’s R&D is performed in developed countries.5
We estimate TFP equations with pooled data for a panel of industries. We
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where k indexes OECD countries, j indexes industries, M (VA) (RD) denotes imports
(value added) (R&D stock), and  ij a is the import input-output coefficient (which
measures the share of imports of industry j that is sold to industry i).
The first part of equation (2) says that foreign R&D in industry i,  i NRD ,is
the sum, over all industries j, of  j RD , the industry-j R&D obtained through imports
from OECD countries, multiplied by  j a , the share of imports of industry j that is
sold to industry i. The second part of equation (2) says that  j RD  is the sum, over
OECD countries k, of   j jk VA M , the imports of industry-j products from OECD
country k per unit of industry-j value added (i.e., the bilateral openness share),
multiplied by  jk RD , the stock of industry-j R&D in OECD country k.
In fact, we split NRD (foreign R&D) into two parts, the NRD obtained
through imports from the US and Canada  ) NRD ( N , and NRD obtained through
imports from the other 13 OECD countries in our sample  ) NRD ( OT .
The estimated equation is:
(3)
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where Dt (Di) represents time (industry) dummies.
Our sample consists of 6 R&D-intensive and 10 low R&D-intensive
manufacturing industries over the period 1981-98. Details on data sources and
construction for R&D stocks, input-output matrices, the sixteen industries, their
R&D intensity, and the bilateral openness shares, are available from the authors.
5 In 1990 (1995), 96% (94.5%) of the world’s R&D expenditures took place in indus-
trial countries.  Moreover, recent empirical work has shown that much of the technical
change in OECD countries is based on the international diffusion of technology among
OECD countries (Eaton and Kortum, 1999; Keller 2002a). For instance, Eaton and
Kortum (1999) estimate that 87% of French growth is based on foreign R&D. Since
developing countries invest much fewer resources in R&D than OECD countries,
foreign R&D must be even more important for developing countries as a source of
growth.
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4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Before turning to the results, we need to consider the issue that two or
more variables may be trended and contain unit roots, making the regression
results spurious (unless the variables are co-integrated). We reject the hypothesis
that there is a panel unit root for all three variables: TFP, NRDN and NRDOT.  The
results are available from the authors.
Column (i) of Table 1 shows the estimation results of equation (3).
Coefficients of time and industry dummies are not shown. The elasticity of TFP
with respect to NRDN is equal to .361 and is significant at the 1% level (t = 3.01).
The elasticity of TFP with respect to NRDOT is equal to .041 and is not significantly




Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics. The *** (**) (*) means that the coefficient is
significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) significance level. NRDN is the trade-related R&D from
NAFTA countries (USA and Canada), and NRDOT is the trade-related R&D from other OECD
countries. DR = 1 for high R&D-intensity industries, and DR = 0 for low R&D- intensity
industries.
Thus, Mexico obtains large and statistically significant productivity gains
from its trade with its NAFTA partners, and obtains very small and statistically
non-significant productivity gains from its trade with the other OECD countries.
Why such a difference? One possibility is that trade between Mexico and its
Northern neighbors involves more than just an exchange of goods. It may entail
personal interaction, including sub-contracting relationships where Mexican firms
import intermediate goods from US firms and export finished products back to the
same firms. In that case, learning is associated not only with the knowledge-
content of the imported goods but also with the close contacts associated with
trade. This is more likely to hold inside NAFTA than with the more distant countries
of Europe, Japan and Australia.
The two measures of foreign R&D, NRDN  and  NRDOT , happen to be highly
correlated. This might affect the regression results. We therefore also examined
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
ln(NRDN) 0.361 0.37 0.403
(3.01)*** (3.27)* (2.52)**






Adjust R2 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.80
Nº of observations 282 282 282 282
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the effect of each measure of foreign R&D separately. This is shown in columns (ii)
and (iii) of Table 2. The results for NRDN are very similar to those when both
measures are used. This is not surprising, given that NRDOT was highly non-
significant in the first regression. The elasticity of TFP with respect to NRDOT is
larger, though still not significant. The larger coefficient is probably due to the fact
that  NRDOT  is capturing some of the effect of  NRDN.
We also examined whether the elasticities differed in the post-NAFTA period
(post-1994) and found no significant difference. Moreover, we ran regressions
with interaction effects of the foreign R&D variables and a dummy variable (DR)
for the  R&D-intensive industries, in order to examine whether the elasticities are
different in those industries. As shown in column (iv) of Table 2, the interaction
effects are not significantly different from zero. Thus, the elasticity of TFP with





1 Other OECD does not include the USA and Canada.
5.  SIMULATION
We must first assess the extent of trade creation and trade diversion
associated with NAFTA. Mexico’s total imports for the 16 industries are shown in
Table 2. Comparing  1994 and 1995, we see that imports remained approximately
unchanged, falling by $.85 billion. Imports from NAFTA countries increased by
$1.1 billion and those from other OECD countries fell by $1.95 billion.  Under trade
diversion, total imports remain unchanged. Assume that total imports remain at
$59.1 billion in 1995 and that the change in imports due to trade diversion is equal
to the average of $1.1 billion and $1.95 billion, or a $1.5 billion increase in imports
from NAFTA neighbors and the same decrease from the other OECD countries. In







1993 46.7 10 56.7 82
1994 47.9 11.2 59.1 81
1995 49 9.3 58.3 84
1996 63.8 10.5 74.3 86
1997 79 13.6 92.6 85
1998 89.5 14.9 104.4 86
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that case, imports from NAFTA neighbors in 1995 would have been $49.4 billion
and those from the rest of the OECD $9.7 billion.
How about trade creation? We assume that the increase in imports from the
rest of the OECD to $10.5 billion in 1996 is due to factors unrelated to NAFTA,
including  unrelated changes in the world and Mexican economies. In percent, that
change is equal to (10.5 -9.7)/9.7 = 8.25%. Second, we assume that the non-NAFTA
forces that led to the increase in imports from the rest of the OECD had the same
proportional impact on Mexico’s imports from NAFTA countries. Imports from
NAFTA are $63.8 billion in 1996. If we correct these for the 8.25% increase, we
obtain that imports from NAFTA countries would have been $58.9 billion in 1998 in
the absence of unrelated shocks in the Mexican or world economies. Finally, we
attribute the remaining increase to trade creation. Thus, trade creation is estimated
to have led to an increase in imports from NAFTA countries from $49.4 billion to
$58.9 billion, or of 19.3%.
Note that if we do the same calculations but use 1997 as a base year, we
obtain an estimate of trade creation of 14.1%, and if we use 1998 as a base year, we
obtain an estimate of 17.9%. In what follows, we use the range of estimates for
trade creation (14.1% to 19.3%) to calculate the impact of NAFTA on Mexico’s
TFP.
We calculate the effect on TFP based on the estimation in column (i) of
Table 1. With an elasticity of .361, and assuming that trade creation has the same
proportional effect on imports for all industries, a 14.1% increase in imports from
NAFTA countries results in a 14.1% increase in NRDN and in a 5.1% increase in
TFP. And a 19.3% increase in imports results in a 7.0% increase in TFP. Thus, we
conclude that trade creation resulted in an increase in the level of productivity of
the manufacturing sector of between 5.1% and 7%.
As for trade diversion, the $1.5 billion increase in imports from NAFTA
countries is about a 3% increase in imports and in   NRDN, which –with the elasticity
of .361– raises TFP by 1.1%. The reduction in imports from the rest of the OECD of
$1.5 billion amounts to a 15.4% reduction in imports and in NRDOT and –with the
elasticity of .041– in a reduction of .63% in TFP. Thus, the net impact of trade
diversion on TFP is (1.1% - .63%) =  .47%.
The total effect of NAFTA on TFP in Mexico’s manufacturing sector ranges
from about 5.6% (5.1% from trade creation plus .47% from trade diversion) to 7.5%
(7% from trade creation plus .47% from trade diversion). The share of manufacturing
in Mexico’s GDP averaged 21.5% in 1996-98. Consequently, NAFTA’s impact on
manufacturing TFP amounted to an increase in GDP ranging from 1.2% to 1.6%.
Panagariya (1999) obtained a loss from NAFTA of close to 1% of GDP while Brown
et al. (1991) obtained a gain of 0.63% of GDP. Thus, our results based on the impact
of NAFTA on technology diffusion seem to dominate the static losses or gains
from NAFTA based on the standard approaches found in the literature. And, due
to a lack of data, we have abstracted from the service sector where benefits from
technology flows are likely to be important.
Mexico’s economy is about one twentieth of that of the rest of NAFTA (US
+ Canada). It thus seems reasonable to assume that NAFTA has only had a minor
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impact on the economies of the US + Canada. Thus, NAFTA has resulted in some
convergence of Mexico’s economy to those of the US and Canada.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the separate effects on Mexico’s TFP of foreign R&D
from the US and Canada, on the one hand, and from the rest of the OECD, on the
other. We find that the impact of foreign R&D on the TFP of Mexico’s manufacturing
sector is large for imports from Mexico’s NAFTA partners but not for imports from
the rest of the OECD.
Based on the estimated TFP equation, we show that NAFTA has led to an
increase in TFP in Mexico’s manufacturing sector of 5.5% to 7.5%. Given the
plausible assumption that it has had negligible effects on the joint economies of
the US and Canada, NAFTA has resulted in some convergence of Mexico’s economy
to those of the US and Canada.
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